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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LARRY SEVERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

S. Ct. No. 42830
D.Ct. No. CV-2009-1408 (Elmore)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REVIEW

Comes now Appellant Larry Severson and offers this Brief on Review. 1

History of the Case
Mr. Severson was convicted in 2004 of one count of first degree murder and one count of
poisoning food or medicine. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,701,215 P.3d 414,421 (2009).
He appealed and this Court affirmed the convictions in a published decision. In the direct appeal,
this Court considered numerous allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, but, over a strong
dissent, the majority declined to grant relief. Id.

Mr. Severson's arguments on appeal have been set out at length in his Opening and
Reply Briefs in this case. Those briefs are before this Court and incorporated in full here. Mr.
Severson will limit his argument in this Brief to respond to the state's brief in support of its
petition for review. In so doing Mr. Severson is not abandoning nor conceding any of the
arguments in the Opening and Reply Briefs.
1
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Mr. Severson then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. R 4-18. Relevant to
this appeal, Mr. Severson alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
prosecutorial misconduct at trial in violation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. R 7 and 12.
The district court summarily dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
the grounds of res judicata because the Supreme Court had found no fundamental error in the
prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. R 144.
Mr. Severson appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further
proceedings in a unanimous decision. The Court held that any claim arising from statements that
were not addressed by the majority on the direct appeal are not barred as res judicata and that
issues decided by this Court pursuant to the prior fundamental error standard applied in the direct
appeal are not barred because the issue in the direct appeal was not identical to the issue in postconviction. The Court did not directly address the second issue raised by Mr. Severson on appeal
- whether he had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was denied effective
assistance of counsel by counsels' failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the state's
closing arguments. Appellant's Opening Brief p. 4-5; State v. Severson, No. 40769, Opinion
filed October 10, 2014. Rather, the Court noted that the state's motion for summary dismissal
had asserted alternative grounds for relief which could be raised anew upon remand. Id., Slip
Op. p. 11, ftnt. 5.
The state filed a petition for review seeking review on two questions:
1. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this Court's
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resolution of substantive issues under the rubric of fundamental error in
Severson's direct appeal had no preclusive effect in relation to those same
substantive issues is a question of substance not heretofore determined by this
Court?
2. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals, contrary to precedent from this
Court, declined to consider whether summary dismissal was appropriate for the
alternative reason that Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact in
support of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's closing argument?
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review p. 7.
This Court has granted review. Order Granting Petition for Review filed January 27,
2015.

Argument on Review
A.

Mr. Severson's Claims in Post-Conviction Are Not Precluded by the
Doctrine of Res Judicata Both Because This Court Never Considered in
Any Way Some of the Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct and Because
Those it Did Consider Were Not Evaluated by the Standard of Review
Applicable to Constitutional Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Significant prosecutorial misconduct occurred in the State's closing argument. Some of it
was not addressed at all by the majority opinion in the direct appeal. Some of it was considered
and found not to be fundamental error. None of it was considered under the test applied to
questions ofineffective assistance of counsel: whether counsel's performance in failing to object
to the misconduct was deficient and if so whether the deficiency was prejudicial insofar as there
was a reasonable probability that absent the deficiency the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
Mr. Severson claimed in post-conviction that he had received constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the prosecutorial misconduct. The state
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argues that res judicata precludes review of Mr. Severson' s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Mr. Severson and the Court of Appeals disagree with the state. Res judicata does not
preclude Mr. Severson's claim ofineffective assistance of counsel because some of the instances
of misconduct were never considered at all in the direct appeal and therefore there has never been
any prior judicial consideration of those instances of misconduct in any guise - either as
misconduct or as an element of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, res judicata does not
preclude Mr. Severson's claim of ineffective assistance as to counsels' failure to object to
instances of prosecutorial misconduct discussed by this Court in the direct appeal because no
court, including this Court, has ever decided whether counsel was deficient in failing to object
and if so, whether there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel
objected.
In this case, as in all cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court
of Appeals' decision, "this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007), as quoted in State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722,725,339 P.3d 1126,
1129 (2014).
The Court of Appeals, noting that the state had conceded that claim preclusion is not
applicable to Mr. Severson's post-conviction claims, set out the five-element test for issue
preclusion as established by this Court in Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157
P.3d 613,618 (2007).
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3)
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the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4)
there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party
against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
litigation.
Slip Op. 9.
The Court of Appeals then concluded that instances of misconduct not addressed by the
majority in the direct appeal are not barred by res judicata. Slip Op. 9-10.
The majority opinion in the direct appeal addressed the following instances of
prosecutorial misconduct:
1. "This is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but
Mary and Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between
them."
2. Statements that Mary was speaking from her grave.
3. References to Mary's family, specifically that Mary was not just a decedent,
but rather a mother, daughter, and sister and that she had just spent her last
Christmas with her family.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 718-720, 215 P.3d at 438-440 (emphasis original).
However, several other instances of misconduct were addressed in Justice W. Jones'
dissent, joined by Justice Pro Tern Kidwell. Justice W. Jones quoted the state's closing
arguments, highlighting the misconduct. His quotation is set out below. The italics are from
Justice Jones' opinion. The bold is added to highlight instances of misconduct not addressed by
the majority opinion.
We are talking about science here; and [the defense attorney's] note - that he
tore down - said, '[t]heory versus fact.' Well, in the real life in this
courtroom, the great leveler of society in here, theory and fact do work
together.
It is not a balloon, where one little microscopic pin breaks the whole balloon.
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This is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but
Mary and Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them.

[Mary's] mouth opened easily. No one else in this courtroom has testified in
front of you, that was there, that they injured Mary Severson's face. The only
thing that they can tell you, [from the expert testimony], is, these injuries [to
her mouth] are consistent with bruising of somebody who could have been
smothered.

[The trip back to Mountain Home in an attempt to rectify the marriage] didn't go
over too well. On December 181\ [Mary] came back for Christmas to stay, left her
mom's house and came back [to Mountain Home], drove back for Christmas, her
last Christmas with her family.

The only thing we have got in this case is what the house can tell us of why
Mary died, what the business tells us of why Mary died. The Hydroxycut
will tell us of why Mary died, and what Mary tells us about why and how she
died.
Mary does speak to us today 33 months later. Mary still speaks to us today.
She is still telling us what happened that night and why she is dead.
During [the time Mary was with her mother in Colorado] the defendant is
out gallivanting around with [his girlfriend]. Some people are even saying,
"Oh, I didn't know you had a daughter." "Well, it's my financee."
[Severson] says its his financee.

So, Mary gets to come home in October to find that this 21-year-old tramp has
gone inside her house and painted her guest bathroom. 2

The majority did address the 21-year-old tramp statement and the Court of Appeals
found that res judicata did apply to that statement as well as the statement "screwing some 21year-old tramp." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440; Slip Op. 9, ftnt. 2.
2
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Yeah, [Mary] had some mild depression. Who wouldn't, after finding out that
your husband is screwing some 21-year-old, having an affair with some 21-yearold girl, and you're getting shipped back to Colorado. Who wouldn't be a little
depressed about that, as a young woman?

Could [somebody else have tampered with the Hydroxycut bottle)? I
suppose, in the same way that there are little green aliens could be coming to
us from Mars or something. It is possible in one way, shape, or form that
that's exactly what somebody did.

Mary tells us, she speaks to us .from her grave as to who killed her and why she
died. All of these circumstances tell us that her body left the indelible evidence
that [the defense] cannot get past, and nobody can get past.

[The defendant's son] didn't see [the bruises on Mary's face prior to
administering CPR]. He wasn't doing that much. That's force. That's
effort. That's putting your hand, at least plausibly, in somebody's face and
making sure the breath is out of there. And making sure you have done the job
right, because by God that woman just won't die. She is strong; she is the
strong one.

Please don't hold that fact, that [the other prosecutor misspoke and] may
have said [the defendant's girlfriend) was nineteen instead of the ripe old age
of 21. Or, she still looks like she is about 19.
And I guess all the witnesses say that they saw Larry running around with a
girl they thought was his daughter, who was a teenager, who was all of age 18
or 19. That may have been playing in the [other prosecutor's] mind.

[The defense attorney] talked a lot about what went on that day, and '[w]e
don't know this, and we don't know that.' He is right. I would love to talk to
Mary Severson and find out, on the early-morning hours of February 151\
how she was feeling. How did the meal make her feel? How did it feel to go
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to dinner with her husband, and not be able to order the food you want?
How many sleeping pills did she take? Why did she take them? If she took
them, did she know how many she took?
I don't get [to] do that. I don't get to ask those questions. Nobody does. All
we know is that according to [the State's expert] - I think a very credible
individual, with nothing to lose in this matter - gave you a good answer as to
how he figured out the total [] [number of pills].

We are done: [the defense counsel] and I, and [co-counsel]. Our job here
before you is complete. Innocent until proven guilty, yes. Today ends that

preposition.
There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary
Severson. She didn't have to die. The only reason she did was the lust and
greed of the defendant to get out of a marriage rather than divorce so he
could get all the money and then some; and he could pursue his other women,
not this fat woman that he saw in front of him who refused to give him the
divorce.

You have a difficult decision to make. There's people in this courtroom who
have been here the entire time that you have heard from. Mary Severson
isn't a body. Mary Severson isn't a picture of bruises. Mary Severson isn't a
decedent.

Mary Severson was the 35-year-old mother of two boys. Mary Severson was the
daughter of Carol Diaz. Mary Severson was the Sister of Maria Gray. Mary
Severson's life had a purpose, and it had meaning. Your duty today is to give
her death justice. Thank you.
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 724-26, 215 P.3d at 444-46 (Jones, W. dissent) (emphasis
original) (bold and footnotes added).
"Urgings explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors other than
the evidence admitted at trial and the law contained in the jury instructions have no place in
closing arguments." State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570,576, 181 P.3d 496,502 (Ct. App. 2007).
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Furthermore, comments about the rights of the victim are misconduct. Id. Moreover, the
prosecutor may not offer his/her personal opinion and beliefs about the credibility of a witness or
the guilt of the accused; make disparaging remarks about opposing counsel; use inflammatory
words to describe a witness or defendant, mischaracterize or misrepresent the evidence, unduly
emphasize irrelevant facts introduced at trial, misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt
burden, or directly or indirectly comment on the invocation of the right to remain silent. State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007).

The misconduct noted by Justice W. Jones and in bold above which was not addressed by
the majority included all of these forms of misconduct - appeals to passion and prejudice,
expressions of personal belief about the credibility of a witness and the guilt of the accused,
disparaging remarks about opposing counsel and the defense presented; use of inflammatory
words to describe a witness and the defendant, mischaracterizations of the evidence, undue
emphasis on irrelevant facts, misrepresentation of the reasonable doubt burden, and direct and
indirect comments on the invocation of the right to remain silent.
As set out by this Court in Ticor Title, supra, to establish issue preclusion, the issue
sought to be precluded must have actually been decided in the prior litigation. Instances of
misconduct never addressed by the majority of the Supreme Court cannot serve as a basis to
exclude Mr. Severson's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in not
objecting to that misconduct.
And, even though the state is apparently seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals'
opinion in full, it has offered no argument or citation to authority to support this Court overruling
Ticor and establishing a new test for issue preclusion. As held in State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
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263,923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), "When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered." See also, IAR 35. "A party waives an issue
cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Zichko,
supra. See also, Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159,168,321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014), citing Zichko

and rejecting issue raised on appeal and awarding costs to the respondent where appellant
"merely states, without support" the appellant's position.
On the basis of the unaddressed instances of misconduct alone, the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the district court erred in determining that Mr. Severson' s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was barred by res judicata should be affirmed by this Court. Indeed, the
state appears to concede as much in its brief in support of the petition for review at page 11,
where it argues that it may be true that the district court erred in applying res judicata applied to
instances of misconduct not addressed by this Court in the direct appeal.
The state does offer argument about why it believes that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that this Court's prior determination, that one bit of the prosecutorial misconduct did not
constitute fundamental error, does not preclude litigation of the question of whether the failure to
object to the statements was ineffective assistance of counsel because it was prejudicial deficient
performance. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review 9-10. In particular the state
argues that this Court found that the statement "Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened
between them" was not misconduct and therefore trial counsel could not have been ineffective in
failing to object to the statement. Id.
However, that is not what this Court held. This Court wrote: "Severson has failed to
prove that the prosecutor's statement was an impermissible comment on his silence that
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constituted fundamental error." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 719,215 P.3d at 439 (emphasis
added). This statement was written with reference to the definition of fundamental error this
Court set out at the beginning of its analysis: "Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error
when it 'goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ... to the foundation of the
case or take[ s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court
could or ought to permit him to waive."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 716,215 P.3d at 436,
quoting State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424,432 (1989). In determining that the
reference to nobody testifying that was there was not fundamental error, this Court noted that the
statement could have been a reference to Mr. Severson' s failure to testify or that it could have
been a reference to Dr. Groben's inability to conclusively establish the cause of the death. This
Court declined to find fundamental error because it was unwilling to accord the statement its
most damaging meaning. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 719,215 P.3d at 439.
To be fundamental error, under the analysis applied in Severson, the statement had to be
unambiguous so as to go to the foundation of Mr. Severson's rights or the foundation of the case.
To be misconduct, the statement simply had to be a direct or indirect comment on the invocation
of the constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of
inferring guilt. State v. Phillips, supra, citing State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713-14, 992 P.2d
158, 162-63 (1999); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588,592,671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v.

A1cMurry, 143 Idaho 312,314, 143 P.3d 400,402 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho
698, 700-03, 132 P.3d 455, 457-60 (Ct. App. 2005).
Because the question of fundamental error was not the same as the question of whether
there was objectionable misconduct, resjudicata does not apply to the single example cited by
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the state in its brief in support of petition for review.
The state also does not attempt to argue that the Court of Appeals was wrong in its
conclusion that to the extent the prior fundamental error standard applied in Mr. Severson's
direct appeal included a determination of prejudice, that standard was far more exacting than the
standard under which the prejudice prong on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
adjudicated and thus a finding of no prejudice in the direct appeal is not res judicata in the postconviction case.
In summary, the state does not attempt to argue either that matters not addressed by the
majority or matters in which a prejudice analysis was made by the majority in the direct appeal
are res judicata for this post-conviction case. Rather, the state argues only that one single
instance of misconduct in commenting on the right to remain silence is res judicata. The state is
incorrect in its analysis of that single comment, but even ignoring that comment, there remains
much prosecutorial misconduct, that, even under state's arguments, is not resjudicata.
Therefore, this Court should conclude as did the Court of Appeals that the district court was
incorrect in summarily dismissing Mr. Severson's petition because his claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel are barred by res judicata.
B.

This Court Should, Like the Court of Appeals, Reverse the Grant of
Summary Dismissal Because Mr. Severson Did Raise a Genuine Issue of
Material Fact as to Whether he Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The state has asked this Court to affirm the grant of summary dismissal on the basis that
Mr. Severson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. In considering this argument, the
distinction between proving claims after an evidentiary hearing and raising a genuine issue of
material fact so as to survive a summary dismissal motion, although not discussed by the state, is
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important.
The law applicable to summary dismissal is uncontroverted:
[I]f the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts
that, if true would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not
be summarily dismissed. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards
utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible
evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Over
questions oflaw, we exercise free review.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show
that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474,480 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). To

survive a summary dismissal motion, the petitioner need not establish the claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the petitioner must only allege facts, that if true, would
entitle him/her to relief. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 793, 152 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct. App.
2007).
The state cites this Court to several cases involving, not motions for summary dismissal,
but rather cases which either involve denial after evidentiary hearings or application of federal
habeas law and standards of review: Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011) (state court finding
of no ineffective assistance of counsel following an evidentiary hearing not an umeasonable
application of clearly established federal law as determined by Supreme Court); Lambert v.
McBride, 365 F.3d 557 (7 th Cir. 2004) (Indiana Supreme Court decision upholding a sentence of
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death which was upheld in state post-conviction proceedings after an evidentiary hearing was not
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court); United States v. Daas, 198F.3d1167 (9 th Cir. 1999) (direct appeal from federal criminal
conviction finding no ineffective assistance of counsel given the record available on review);
United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440 (9 th Cir. 1991) (direct appeal from federal criminal

conviction wherein Ninth Circuit declined to address one issue of ineffective assistance because
it was potentially meritorious but could not be decided on the appellate record and Court did not
wish to foreclose the right to present it in a habeas proceeding and finding no ineffectiveness in
remaining instances of alleged deficient performance); Vicory v. State, 81 S. W.3d 725 (Mo. App.
2002) (affirming denial of post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing).
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review p. 11-12.
The state's primary argument is that Mr. "Severson did not allege any facts sufficient to
overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to object was anything but a reasonable,
tactical decision. Id. 12. Presumably, in making this argument, the state is claiming that to
survive a summary judgment motion, Mr. Severson needed to present evidence from his prior
counsel that their decision to not object was not a reasonable tactical decision. This argument is,
however, contrary to this Court's and the Court of Appeals' precedent.
In AfcKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,225 P.3d 700 (2010), this Court reversed an order of
summary dismissal in a post-conviction case wherein Mr. McKay had claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel. The claim was based on trial counsel's failure to object to an erroneous
jury instruction which omitted an element of the crime. With regard to the presumption that
counsel's decision not to object was reasonable, this Court concluded: "[T]here is no conceivable
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tactical justification for trial counsel's failure to object. Thus, McKay's trial attorney was
objectively deficient in that regard." 148 Idaho at 572,225 P.3d at 705.
Similarly, in Martinez v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary
dismissal. In that case, Mr. Martinez averred that defense counsel had not informed him of all
the elements of the offense prior to advising a guilty plea. The Court of Appeals concluded that
Mr. Martinez had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to deficient performance because
"[f]ailing to inform a client of an element of the charged offense prior to advising the client to
plead guilty to the charge, when the client has denied the existence of that element, cannot be a
tactical or strategic decision." 143 Idaho at 795, 152 P.3d at 1243. See also, Cook v. State, 157
Idaho 775, 778, 339 P.3d 1179, 1182 (Ct. App. 2014), noting that if testimony could not have
been properly admitted, that it can be reasonably inferred, absent evidence to the contrary, that
the attorney's failure to object was the product of ignorance of the relevant law rather than a
tactical decision; and State v. Aspeytia, 130 Idaho 12, 18,936 P.2d 210,216 (Ct. App. 1997),
finding ineffective assistance in direct appeal, even absent evidence as to counsel's reasons or
lack thereof for failing to object to certain evidence, where the evidence was not only
inadmissible but also tended to be adverse to the defense.
In this case, Mr. Severson raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by directing
the court to counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in closing. The failure to
object raised a genuine issue of material fact because the prosecutor's conduct was clearly
improper and clearly harmful to the defense. There could be no conceivable tactical reason for
failing to object to this evidence. Based upon McKay, Martinez, Cook, and A.speytia, this Court
should reject the state's argument that Mr. Severson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact
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as to deficient performance.
The state also argues that Mr. Severson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
prejudice. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review 12-15. Yet, Mr. Severson's
reference in his pleading to the dissent in the direct appeal did raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding prejudice because the dissent found that the prosecutorial misconduct, including
that simply not addressed by the majority, in closing denied Mr. Severson a fair trial. 147 Idaho
at 728,215 P.3d at 448. This combined with the transcripts of the trial which were submitted in
support of Mr. Severson's petition was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
prejudice.
The state's case against Mr. Severson was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
No one could testify that Mr. Severson had tampered with the Hydroxcut capsules. State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 700-701, 215 P.3d at 420-21; Trial Tr. And, in fact, the jury heard expert
testimony that Ms. Severson' s body showed no indication of ingestion of a caustic substance.
Trial Tr. Vol. 7, p. 3038, In. 18-p. 3040, In. 12. Similarly, no one could establish how Ms.
Severson died. State v. Severson, supra. The state presented testimony that she could have died
from an overdose of sleeping pills. Trial Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1290, In. 1-8; p. 1318, In. 5-17; Vol. 3, p.
1819, In. 17-p. 1820, In. 25; p. 1831, In. 11-15. But, it presented no evidence that Mr. Severson
caused the overdose. Trial Tr. The state also presented testimony that Ms. Severson had injuries
consistent with its theory of smothering, but the jury also heard ample evidence, both from the
state's witness, the emergency room doctor, and defense witnesses, that the injuries observed
were consistent with failed CPR efforts. Trial Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1118, ln. 2-p. 1120, ln. 13; Vol. 6, p.
3022, In. 21-p. 2023, ln. 23; Vol. 7, p. 3882, ln. 17-p. 3883, In. 4.
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Indeed, the district court itself noted at the time of the Rule 29 motion, given the case that
the state had presented, the jury could have acquitted. Trial Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3647, ln. 7-p. 3648, ln.
1. This alone was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether absent the
deficient performance of counsel there was a reasonable probability of a different result. In a
case so close that the judge comments that the jury could acquit, there was clearly a reasonable
probability that without the deficient performance of counsel a different outcome would have
resulted.
In sum, Mr. Severson did raise a genuine issue of material fact both as to deficient
performance and as to prejudice and summary dismissal was inappropriate.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in the Opening and Reply Briefs and above, Mr. Severson asks
that this Court reverse the order of partial summary dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this// t£day of February, 2015.

~¥

Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Larry Severson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing document to be:

i-

mailed
hand delivered
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to:
Jessica Lorello
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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